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POETS AND OTHER MAKERS: 






Agathon’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is commonly dismissed as a piece of 
insubstantial rhetoric.  This, I hope to show, is a mistake.  The mistake, as I see it, lies 
in a failure to recognise the pivotal role that Agathon’s presentation of Erōs as a 
universal poiētēs plays in the dialogue.  Admittedly, Agathon’s claim is both 
improbable in itself and incompetently defended.  Yet, for all its shortcomings, it is a 
claim that Diotima will later endorse by reformulating it at a crucial stage of her own 
argument.  By her reformulation and, still more, by her development of Agathon’s 
initial claim, Diotima will provide Alcibiades with a major element in his encomium 
of Socrates.  Later still, at the close of the dialogue, Agathon’s own words will find an 
echo in Socrates’ puzzling parting shot.   
 
What precisely is Agathon’s conception of Erōs?  How is it defended?  These 
questions will be addressed first.  Once Agathon’s various claims regarding the 
‘poetic’ nature of Erōs have been clarified, their impact on the ensuing speeches can 
be assessed, and their significance for the development of Plato’s poetics considered. 
 
 
I. Agathon: Erōs as Poet and Maker  
 
 
The ambiguity of poiein 
 
In the last part of his speech (196 D 4 – 197 E 8), the part which I shall here 
concentrate upon, Agathon asserts that, like himself, Love is a poet (poiētēs).  
Presumably to mitigate the smugness of this claim, Agathon adds that Love should 
not be thought of as a run of the mill poet.  For Love, so he says, possesses sophia 
(wisdom, 196 D 5 and 197 A 2), and is therefore sophos (wise, 196 E 1).  A few lines 
later, he will also tell us that Love is agathos (good, 196 E 4).  How should we 
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interpret these two claims?  Are we to understand sophia and sophos, as well possibly 
as agathos, to denote no more in this context than ‘skill’ and ‘skilled’ in poiēsis, 
poiēsis which Agathon, in common with his contemporaries, views as a branch of 
mousikē (sc. technē)?  If that is all that Agathon implies, need we take his claim about 
Love’s poetic skill to be anything other than a vacuous assertion on the part of a vain 
and precious belletrist who likes the idea of sharing, at however modest a level, in the 
god’s activity?  No doubt, this is partly what it is.  But I shall argue that, in the context 
of the dialogue as a whole, it is also something else.  I shall argue that Agathon’s 
claim introduces a theme that Diotima will pick up in her own speech, to give it 
theoretical expression.   
 
The theme in question is that Erōs is a poiētēs, which here means a maker, a 
maker whose extraordinary skill, as presented by Agathon and later by Diotima, lies 
in making others make.  Put into modern terminology, the claim is that Love 
motivates gods and humans to achieve success in areas in which they would not 
otherwise have succeeded.  Thus Agathon, most notably, commends Erōs for being 
the driving force (cf. ἡγεμονεύειν) behind the invention of the various technai by 
lesser deities (197 A 6 – B 3).  Since minds, divine as well as human, are themselves 
sources of agency, it follows that Love’s making – or poetic – activity (poiēsis) is 
both direct and indirect.  Love’s causation is direct in so far as it is under his skilful 
prompting that a person in love undertakes certain activities.  This means that 
whichever activity a person in love is minded to undertake has indirectly been 
undertaken by Love.  How Love can exert such double power of agency, Agathon 
never tells us with any amount of precision.  At times, as we are about to see, he uses 
the language of teaching, at others that of physiological impulses, and at yet others 
that of desire.   
  
Agathon introduces his theme by noting the effectiveness of Love’s impulse.  
Love, so he claims, can make (poiein) anyone into a poet (a poiētēs), even those who 
had been entirely lacking in poetic ability (amousos) before (196 E 1 – 3).  Agathon’s 
deliberate play on the common root of poiein and poiētēs may well strike the casual 
reader of the dialogue as little more than a self-indulgent pun, coupled with a literary 
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allusion to a well-known Euripidean line1.  But the casual reader would be wrong so 
to dismiss Agathon’s word play.  Within the wider context of the dialogue as a whole, 
this seemingly trivial pun foreshadows Diotima’s presentation of Erōs as a daimōn  
 
Within the narrower context of Agathon’s own speech, this word play 
introduces the theme of the motivating force of Erōs.  The extravagant claim that Erōs 
‘makes’ poets is best interpreted as flowing from Agathon’s stated intention of not 
leaving unmentioned any aspect of Love’s sophia (196 D 5 – 6).  As it turns out, 
Agathon will fulfil this intention by outlining the range of application of Love’s 
sophia rather than by describing its nature.  First, he praises Love’s excellence as a 
poet (poiētēs).  At this point, his complacent reference to his own craft may seem to 
suggest that Love’s wisdom lies exclusively in the field of poetry (mousikē).  
Although this would be a likely claim on Agathon’s part, this is not quite the claim 
that Plato makes him express at this point.  As the consecutive clause makes clear, 
Agathon presents Love’s making as pedagogic in nature (196 E 1 – 2).  Love, he 
claims, ‘makes’ a poet in the sense that he is the impulse that drives people to write 
poems, even if they had not previously shown any talent for poetry (196 E 1 – 3).   
 
This is the point at which the ambiguity in the use of poiētēs is introduced. 
Although poiētēs normally means a writer of verse, the word is here taken to refer to a 
‘maker’, namely Erōs, who can make anyone into a poet.  This ambiguity in the use of 
the word is to continue in the next two clauses.  In the first, we are told that ποιητὴς ὁ 
῎Ερως ἀγαθὸς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικήν (‘Erōs is good as a 
poet/maker mainly in respect of all forms of poetry/making that fall under the heading 
of mousikē’, 196 E 4-5)2.  The ambiguity of poiētēs and poiēsis in Agathon’s usage 
poses problems for the translator.  Do poiētēs and poiēsis here mean ‘poet’ and 
‘poetry’ or do they mean ‘maker’ and ‘making’?   
 
If they mean ‘poet’ and ‘poetry’, Agathon’s statement is tautological, probably 
even doubly so since, on this interpretation, the lines in question should be rendered 
as: ‘Love is good as a poet ... in respect of all forms of poetry that fall under the 
                                                 
1 Euripides, fr. 663 (Stheneboea) ‘it seems that Erōs teaches a poet even if there is no music in him 
before’, tr. Dover (1980). 
2 Here and after, translations not attributed are my own. 
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heading of mousikē’3.  But then how should we translate ἐν κεφαλαίῳ?   If we keep 
this tautology (single or double), ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, whether understood in a restrictive or a 
summative sense, is entirely redundant.   
 
If, on the other hand, poiētēs and poiēsis mean ‘maker’ and ‘making’, the 
statement is no longer tautological, in so far as it provides a measure of information.  
Admittedly, the information provided (i.e. ‘Love is a maker’) might have seemed 
puzzling if the immediate context had not made its meaning reasonably clear by 
specifying the range of Love’s making.  So it is that in the previous two lines, we are 
told that Love can make anyone write poems.  So it is also that in the next clause, 
introduced by an explanatory gar (196 E 5), Agathon picks up, not on Erōs’ own 
proficiency as a poet, but, once again, on a transmission of his power, justified by 
what may well be the earliest explicit use of the principle ‘nemo dat quod non habet’.  
Love, Agathon is intent upon proving, is ‘poetic’ also in areas which have nothing 
whatsoever to do with music and poetry.  Presently, he will name several fields in 
which this is so.  The context of the lines 196 E 4 - 5, therefore, supports the 
translation of poiētēs by ‘maker’ and of poiēsis by ‘making’.   
 
A second problem of interpretation revolves around the precise translation of 
ἐν κεφαλαίῳ.  ἐν κεφαλαίῳ is often rendered by ‘in short’4.  This rendering would 
here have the disadvantage of excluding from Love’s ‘making’ any aspects of his 
wisdom other than mousikē.  But, as we have seen, it is not Agathon’ intention to 
exclude them.  Furthermore, since these fields have not so far been mentioned, there 
is at this point nothing as yet for ἐν κεφαλαίῳ to summarise.  I therefore render it by 
‘mainly’, a meaning that lies well within its semantic range.   
 
The ambiguity in the use of poiein is to remain unresolved.  Although the 
context favours the rendering of poiētēs and poiēsis by ‘maker’ and ‘making’ 
respectively, and although ἐν κεφαλαίῳ is most naturally translated in such a way as 
                                                 
3 The second tautology depends on whether mousikē is here used to denote ‘any art over which the 
Muses preside, esp. poetry sung to music’ (L.S.J., s.v., I.1 [p. 1148]) rather than, more generally, ‘art or 
letters’ (L.S.J., s.v., II).  Since Agathon had earlier expressed the intention of honouring his own craft 
of tragic poetry, we may take it as a virtual certainty that, in the context of his speech, mousikē does 
denote ‘music and poetry’.  Hence it is almost certain that his statement is to be taken as doubly 
tautological.      
4 It is so translated by both Bury (1909) and Rowe (1998). 
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to support this interpretation (i.e. as ‘mainly’), it should nevertheless be recognised 
that Agathon’s argument trades on the ambiguity that he has built into his concepts of 
poiētēs and poiēsis.  On the one hand, according to current linguistic usage, poiētēs 
and poiēsis mean ‘poet’ and ‘poetry’.  On the other hand, by right of etymology - 
poiētēs derives from poiein - they also mean, more widely, ‘maker’ and ‘making’.  It 
is precisely this semantic extension, legitimised, so to speak, by etymology, which 
generates the ambiguity in Agathon’s use of poiētēs and poiēsis.   Whoever ποιεῖ is 
therefore a poet, a ποιητής, and his activity, whether literary or not, can therefore be 
called ποίησις.  Love’s capacity to turn habitually prosaic persons into poets, 
therefore, is but one example of his aptitude to enable others to do that which they had 
not previously been able to do.  The ambiguity which lies at the core of Agathon’s 
concepts of poiētēs and poiēsis is precisely what will enable Diotima later to develop 
her own, philosophical, argument on the omnipresence of Love in human lives.  
  
Agathon’s own, immediate, reasons for celebrating Love’s skill as a maker, 
and especially a maker of poets, however, are hardly likely to be philosophical.  It 
may be that the thought pleases him that his recent victory in a dramatic competition 
was a sign of Love’s favour.  It would also be in character for him to trot out the 
platitude that love can cause otherwise perfectly ordinary people to wax lyrical about 
all sorts of things.  But, being Agathon, he has to dress up both vanity and platitudes.  
He does so by putting forward extravagant claims on Erōs’ behalf. 
 
Admittedly, Plato’s Agathon is a muddle head.  He reasons as he goes along, 
that is hardly at all.  Although he uses appropriate conjunctions and particles of 
transition, his argument is made up of a number of uncoordinated jumps.  Yet, for all 
his confusion, Agathon succeeds where Eryximachus had failed, namely in raising 
questions in our minds.  He prepares us for Diotima’s revelations.   
 
To describe Love’s capabilities, Agathon will first use the terminology of 
teaching.  Love, he says, who can turn the prosaic into the poetic, can therefore be 
described as a teacher or a poet (poiētēs) in the extended sense of the word: ‘what one 
either doesn’t have or doesn’t know, one can’t give another person or teach anyone 
else’ (196 E 5 – 6, tr. Rowe, slightly modified).  The principle ‘nemo dat quod non 
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habet’ furnishes Agathon with the major premise in a reasoning destined to prove that 
Love himself possesses the technē of poiēsis: 
Loves teaches the prosaic to be poetic; 
One cannot teach a technē that one does not possess: 
Therefore Love possesses the technē of poetry. (196 E 1 – 6)  
Q.E.D. (for Agathon, if not for others) 
The implication of this syllogism, with which I have obligingly supplied Agathon, has 
to be that Love himself possesses the capacity to compose poems.  According to 
Agathon, therefore, Love is a poet (poiētēs) in the narrow, non eccentric, sense of the 
word.  Significantly, Agathon will not draw a similar inference from Love’s ability to 
inspire others in the invention of technai such as weaving, archery and government.  
Agathon will not suggest that Love himself is a master weaver or a nonpareil 
statesman.  Ironically enough, he will not even claim that Erōs is himself an 
accomplished archer.5  Only in the case of poetry, it seems, does Love pass on 
something of his own capability to those he empowers.  To what extent does this 
difference in treatment suggest that Agathon viewed poetry as significantly different 
from other technai?  Alas, there is not enough evidence in his speech to tell one way 
or another.  From a modern scholarly point of view, this is all the more unfortunate 
since his answer to this question might have shed some light on his speechwriter’s 
own, notoriously tangled, views on the matter.  
 
 
Love’s Teaching and Love’s Touch 
 
Agathon’s use of the terminology of the classroom to eulogize Love throws up 
a fresh oddity in his speech:  
... do we not recognise that whoever has this god as his teacher 
(διδάσκαλος) turns out famous and conspicuous, but whomsoever Love 
does not touch (Ἔρως μὴ ἐφάψηται) stays in obscurity? (197 A 4 -6, tr. 
Rowe, modified)  
                                                 
5 The first appearance of this metaphor in the extant literature is in Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis, 548, a 
play which he is likely to have started shortly before leaving Athens for exile in Thessaly in 408.  Since 
it was in 416 that Agathon won first prize at the Lenaian festival, any knowledge on his part of 
Iphigenia at Aulis has to be ruled out.  The metaphor itself, however, could well have had currency 
before Euripides used it in this particular play.  For the date of Agathon’s victory, see Pickard-
Cambridge (1953: 38).     
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It is a feature of Agathon’s speech that the agency of Love is repeatedly described in 
terms and metaphors of tactility.  Love, he had said earlier, sets his abode (τὴν ὄικησιν 
ἵδρυεσθαι, 195 E 4 - 5) in the souls of gods and men, touches the softest amongst 
them (ἅπτεσθαι, 195 E 7 - 8), and enfolds them (περιπτύσσειν, 196 Α 2 - 3).  No 
doubt, Agathon’s use of these metaphors is meant to echo Pausanias’ earlier claim on 
the appropriateness of accepting sexual favours in return for the teaching of true 
excellence.  We may even speculate that Agathon’s words are likely to have struck his 
fellow diners as a pretty acknowledgement of the teaching he had received from his 
older lover.   
 
If, however, Agathon’s intention had been so to acknowledge Pausanias’ 
teaching, he would, by the same token, have disregarded Socrates’ earlier warning 
that wisdom cannot be passed on by physical contact:  
It would be a fine thing, Agathon, if wisdom were the kind of thing that 
would flow from the fuller to the emptier of us two, when we touch each 
other, like the water which flows from a fuller cup to an emptier one 
through a woollen thread.  (175 D 3 – 7)   
The fact that the very same warning is sounded at the end of the dialogue shows its 
significance for Plato.  Indeed, the description of Socrates’ rebuff of Alcibiades’ 
sexual advances will no doubt have been meant as, amongst other things, a rejection 
of the conception of Love’s teaching by contact that had earlier been put forward, in 
various ways, by Pausanias, Agathon and Alcibiades.6   
 
 
Teaching, ‘Touching’ and Inspiration 
 
Even if one were to interpret Agathon’s claim concerning Love’s divine touch 
as a colourful simile for what tends nowadays to be called inspiration, the conception 
of teaching as physical contact that this simile presupposes would still be profoundly 
un-Platonic.  Teaching and inspiring are poles apart in Plato’s philosophy.  In the 
Socratic conception of teaching, as put forward in the Meno and the Theaetetus, 
teaching consists in reviving knowledge in, or imparting cognitive skills to, a learner 
                                                 
6 A similar point is made in Sayre (1995: 97-105 and 110-11). 
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who actively collaborates in the process.7  Inspiring, by contrast, relies upon the use 
of non rational means to produce an effect upon another who receives, more or less 
passively, whatever is pressed upon him.  Inspiration is an undeserved and therefore 
gratuitous gift.   
 
So much at least is clear from the Ion, where poetry is presented as the 
paradigmatic field of inspiration: the finest poetry, Socrates is there made to claim, is 
written by poets when they find themselves possessed by a Muse.  Verbs such as 
katechesthai (in the passive voice), enthusiazein, or even bakcheuein are repeatedly 
used to describe the process of poetic composition.  Didaskein, in Socrates’ own 
preferred sense of the word, is never used.  In the Phaedrus, too, poetic inspiration is 
presented as a form of heaven-sent possession (κατακωχή or μανία) which stimulates 
a poet to rapt and passionate expression in the composition of all kinds of  poetry (245 
A 1 – 3).        
 
There is more to the issue, however, than a mere description of the poetic 
process.  If Plato never varied in ascribing great poetry to divine inspiration, he varied 
in his assessment of the poet’s state of mind at the time of composition.  In the Ion, 
the poet is presented as a brainless hierophant, innocent of any technē and therefore 
entirely dependent on his particular Muse for the composition of fine poems of a 
specific genre (533 D 1 – 535 A 2).  In other words, the poet is as undeserving as the 
Muse is capricious.  An interpreter (hermeneus) of his inspiring deity, the poet may 
well be, but this does not make his message especially worth hearing.  Indeed, in so 
far as the poet, through the intermediary of the rhapsode, communicates his own state 
of intoxication to his audience, he may even be described as an agent of irrationality.   
 
In the Phaedrus, by contrast, Plato describes the poet’s state of mind in broadly 
positive terms.  He does now acknowledge the existence of a technē of poetry, 
although he denies that it alone can account for the composition of fine poems (245 A 
5-8).  Technē, Socrates now states, must be complemented by divine inspiration.  As 
for the poet, he is no longer branded a brainless and irrational bard, but is, on the 
contrary, praised for his possession of a delicate and pure soul.  The poet, it is now 
                                                 
7 Meno 87 B-C; Theaetetus, 201 A 7 – C 7. 
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implied, deserves the divine gift of poetic inspiration.  Lastly, the gift itself is now 
presented as wholly beneficent since it enables poets to instruct (paideuein) future 
generations in the mighty deeds of ancient times (245 A 3- 4).   
  
So much for Plato.  Agathon’s own ambiguous use of poiēsis comes again to the 
fore when, to show the full extent of Love’s sphere of influence, he moves from 
mousikē to animal reproduction, from the high-falutin’ to the down-to-earth.  He 
introduces his point as a rhetorical question: 
... as for that other type of creation, of all living creatures, who will refuse 
to accept that it is Love’s wisdom by which all living things come into 
being and are born? (196 E 6 - 197 A 3, tr. Rowe)  
Love’s sphere of influence, it seems, in Agathon’s scheme of things, ranges from 
Homer’s poetry to the mating calls of animals.  Unlike Agathon’s previous claim, this 
one is clear, simple, even obvious; it has, if one may say so, the facts of life in its 
favour.  Furthermore, the sexual impulse, as here described by Agathon, has one 
feature in common with poetic composition, as earlier presented: both are 
characterised as a force that comes from outside, bidden or not, bestows its favour, 
and departs as unexpectedly as it has come.  Such indeed may have been Agathon’s 
vague meaning when, earlier in his speech, he had said of Erōs that it ‘passes through 
the whole soul, first, and then passes out again without our being aware of it’ (196 A 
2 - 4).  No technē is involved in this aspect of Love’s activity. 
 
 
Love and Desire 
 
However, Agathon does not leave matters there.  To demonstrate the power of 
Love, he changes tack one more time, introduces the conceptual apparatus of desire, 
and brings it to bear on technē.  The elenchus that Socrates will presently direct at 
Agathon for his handling of the concept of desire has made this the best-known part 
of the encomium.  At 197 A7 - 8, his self-confidence still undented, Agathon equates 
desire (epithumia) with love, thereby positing a premise that will be his undoing.  
How indeed could he possibly square this premise with his earlier claim that Erōs is 
the youngest of the gods, and king of them all (195 A 1 and C 5)?  Taken together, 
premise and claim commit Agathon to the wildly implausible thesis that only from the 
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moment when Erōs appeared amongst them was desire for the beautiful kindled in the 
gods.  But implausibility, as we are soon to learn from Socrates, is but a minor flaw in 
Agathon’s encomium.     
 
Desire, so Agathon insists, could not arise as long as the hateful bond of 
necessity (anagkē, 195 C 3 - 5 and 197 B 5-7) held sway over the gods.  Erōs, once he 
had ‘taken his abode in the characters and souls of the gods’ (195 E 4 - 5), enabled 
them to organize their own affairs.  Moved and taught by him, the gods invented all 
manner of technai, thereby enhancing their own lives and those of human beings.  To 
mousikē, which had previously been mentioned, Agathon now adds archery, 
medicine, prophecy, metalworking, weaving, and government.  The very invention of 
these technai, he intimates, is proof of Love’s beneficent influence on the lives of 
both gods and humans.    
 
Unfortunately for him, Agathon fails to realise that, in this, his third and last 
presentation of Love’s power, he has undermined the whole burden of his speech up 
to that point.  For desire presupposes the perception of a lack, perception of a lack 
implies failure of self-sufficiency, and failure of self-sufficiency is, in turn, 
incompatible with the all round perfection that he claims for Erōs.   
 
The failure of Agathon’s last argument prompts Socrates’ two-part elenchus.  
In the first part, Socrates leads Agathon to acknowledge that he had disregarded the 
logic of his basic concepts.  Love, Socrates explains, is (what we would call) a two-
place predicate in so far as it cannot but have an intentional object, which it strives to 
possess.  As for desire, it is necessarily focused on what the desiring agent perceives 
as a lack.   
 
In the second part of the elenchus, Socrates uses these elementary points to 
correct the last substantive claim in Agathon’s encomium, his identification of love 
and desire.  Surprisingly enough, neither here nor elsewhere does Socrates question 
Agathon’s personification of love as the god Erōs, and his consequent assumption that 
what is true of Erōs is true of love.  Instead, Socrates exposes the incoherence that lies 
at the heart of Agathon’s claim by showing him that, if Love (Erōs) is love and desire 
of beauty, and if desire cannot but be of what one lacks, it follows that Love (Erōs) 
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loves and desires ‘what he lacks and does not have’ (201 B 1).  Agathon is forced to 
accept Socrates’ conclusion that ‘Love (Erōs) lacks beauty’ (201 B 4).   
 
The stage is now set for Diotima’s entrance.   
 
 
II. Diotima: Daimonic Men and Other Makers   
 
Diotima will first give Socrates a dose of the very medicine that he has just 
been administering to Agathon. She brings two conceptual points to his attention.  
The proper object of love, the priestess first points out, is that which is worthy to be 
loved, namely ‘the truly beautiful’ (τῷ ὄντι καλόν, 204 C 4).  To the conative element 
that Socrates had identified in the concept of love, she thereby adds a normative 
dimension.  The norm is objective in so far as ‘what is truly beautiful’ is, by 
implication, contrasted with what is beautiful merely in the eye of the beholder.  This 
objective norm will later constitute a crucial premise in her demonstration that the 
ultimate object of love is Beauty ‘in itself and by itself’ (211 B 1).  Diotima’s second 
conceptual adjustment consists in pointing out to Socrates that Erōs is more correctly 
conceived as ‘that which does the loving’ (τὸ ἐρῶν) than as ‘that which is loved’ (τὸ 
ἐρώμενον, 204 C 1 - 3).  ‘That which does the loving’ is striving to reach ‘that which 
is worthy of love’ – such is the as yet unvoiced conclusion that hovers over the 
opening section of Diotima’s argument. 
 
Diotima’s famous allegorical account of Erōs’ birth is a vivid and colourful 
expression of her second conceptual point.  Her sharp awareness of the logic of desire 
leads her to deny Erōs the divine status that Agathon had been pleased to claim for 
him.  No longer the youngest and best of all the gods, or even a deity, Diotima’s Erōs 
is a daimōn, sharing in both the divine and the human orders (202 D 13 – E 1).  
Because he perpetually suffers from lack, of one sort or another, Erōs finds himself in 
a constant state of desire. 
  
Diotima’s next step is to draw an analogy between Erōs and human beings. 
Like Erōs, we, human beings, she says, wish always to possess the fine things that we 
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lack (205 A 5 – 7).  This makes lovers of us all, always.  The conclusion is 
paradoxical, and Diotima is aware of it.  How can it be, she asks rhetorically, that 
such a crucial aspect of human nature has remained unrecorded in current linguistic 
usage?  By way of an explanation, she draws on the semantic range of poiētēs and 
poiēsis, the very point that Agathon had made in his own speech (205 B 8 – C 9).    
 
‘Love’ and ‘lover’, so she contends, are words that have become restricted, in 
common usage, to the emotional, and even sexual, relationship of one person with 
another, whereas the true meaning of the word, so she assures her disciple, covers a 
whole range of speech and activity.  To support her thesis that linguistic practices are 
contingent upon common usage and can therefore sometimes be at variance with 
etymology, which she takes to be the true bearer of meaning, she invokes the 
following example.  Like erōs and erastēs, she holds, poiēsis and poiētēs, which apply 
by right to a wide range of human activity, have been semantically restricted to one 
domain only.  In its most general form, she asserts, poiēsis covers any production of 
being from non-being, whereas in common parlance the word has been restricted to 
the production of songs or poems: 
οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ· ἡ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι 
ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις 
ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί.    
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.    
Ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, ἦ δ᾽ ἥ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐ καλοῦνται ποιηταὶ ἀλλὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν 
ὀνόματα, ἀπὸ δὲ πάσης τῆς ποιήσεως ἓν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ τὴν 
μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῷ τοῦ ὅλου ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται. ποίησις γὰρ 
τοῦτο μόνον καλεῖται, καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ποιήσεως 
ποιηταί.    
(‘You’re aware that poiēsis includes a large range of things: after all, what 
causes anything whatever to pass from not being into being is all poiēsis, 
so that the activities that belong to all the technai are in fact kinds of 
poiēsis, and their practitioners are all poets. 
True. 
All the same, she replied, you’re aware that they are not called poets, but 
have other names; one part has been divided off from poiēsis as a whole, 
the part concerned with music and verse, and is called by the name of the 
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whole.  This alone is called poiēsis, and those to whom this part of poiēsis 
belongs are called poets.’ (205 B 7 – C 9, tr. Rowe, slightly modified.)           
 
Diotima makes the issue appear far simpler than it is.  To begin with, the lexical 
phenomenon that she appeals to is more complex than her words suggest.  Although it 
is true that in pre-Platonic classical Greek, poiēsis can mean ‘making’ or ‘fabrication’, 
this usage is rare, being mostly confined to Herodotus (3.22.13) and Thucydides 
(3.2.2.2).  Furthermore, it seems very possible that it was Plato himself who later 
actively spread this generic use, to the extent that most of the examples listed under 
that rubric by Liddell, Scott and Jones are drawn from his writings.8  Whether poiētēs 
was used before Plato to refer to anyone but the writer of verse is a moot point.  
Admittedly, in the Cyropaideia (I.6.38), Xenophon writes of a poiētēs mēchanēmatōn 
(a maker of stratagems).  But was the Cyropaideia written before the Symposium?  
Probably, but not certainly.  All in all, therefore, it would appear that Plato has made 
Diotima exaggerate the extent of the linguistic phenomenon that she reports.   
 
If so, why did he do so?  The likely reason is that he wanted backing for the 
comparable generic meaning that he was making her claim for erastēs.  Yet, in so far 
as analogies can only illustrate arguments, as opposed to grounding them, the support 
is meager.  But Diotima is a hierophant as well as a philosopher, if not more so.  
Rather than expecting her to deal exclusively in arguments, therefore, we may also 
look elsewhere for the significance of her little lexical excursus.   
 
The excursus, so I shall argue, fulfils a double function, one of which is literary 
and the other philosophical.  From a literary point of view, it links Diotima’s speech 
to Agathon’s, thereby enhancing the structural and thematic unity of the dialogue.  
Rather than a theory of her own invention, Diotima’s presentation of Erōs as a 
mediator between the human and the divine orders is meant to strike the reader as a 
coherent expression of ideas that had earlier been airily broached by their host.  The 
full significance of Agathon’s non-philosophical description of Erōs as a universal 
poiētēs, indirectly responsible for the making of all manner of things, from poems to 
woven cloth to live offspring, is revealed only retrospectively.  Interpreted from the 
                                                 
8  On Plato’s use of mousikē and the derivatives of poiein to denote poetry, See Vicaire (1964).  
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vantage point of Diotima’s speech, it can no longer be viewed as the mere diversion 
that it had seemed at first approach.  What the reader had taken to be a parody of the 
Gorgianic style of a feather-brained young dramatist is in fact, in more ways than one, 
a foil to Diotima’s own definition of poiēsis.  Its function in the dialogue is now seen 
as that of providing Diotima with an analogy in support of her own claim concerning 
the omnipresence of love in human lives.  In spelling out the semantic assumptions 
that Agathon had left unvoiced, Diotima transforms his flowery but vacuous claims 
on Love and poiēsis into a highly theoretical conception of love as a universal 
motivational factor.       
 
From a philosophical point of view, Diotima’s excursus fulfils a double 
function.  It provides an occasion for rehabilitating, to some modest extent, the poetic 
function, which had been disparaged in the Ion and the Gorgias.  More generally, it 
sanctions the use of non-rational modes of cognition in the pursuit of religious aims.    
By ascribing these views to Diotima, a woman and a priestess, Plato was able to avoid 
giving them Socratic approval and therefore, indirectly, his own. 
 
In treating poiēsis in the wide sense of the word (sc. ‘making’) as a genus 
whose species include poiēsis in the narrow sense of the term (sc. ‘poetry’), Plato is 
assuming (205 B 8 – C 9) what he had denied in the Ion and the Gorgias, namely that 
poetry is a technē.  But Diotima’s implicit inclusion of poetry amongst the technai 
carries ambivalent implications.  Although the classification enables Plato to 
recognise that there is something that poets uniquely know, it nonetheless appears to 
relegate them to the rank of dēmiourgoi in so far as it puts them on a par with 
shoemakers, medical men, temple builders and all those whose professional activity is 
based on specialised knowledge.  Should it be concluded that, in the Symposium, the 
recognition of the epistemic credentials of poetry comes at the cost of denying its 
uniquely creative value?  To this question, with due qualification, I shall give a 
negative answer, drawn from the concept of the daimonic which Diotima introduces 
to differentiate between two kinds of dēmiourgoi.        
 
Daimones, who are many and various (πολλοὶ καὶ παντοδαποί, 203 A 7), 
Diotima had said earlier, are go-betweens who interpret (cf. hermēneuein, 202 E 3) 
gods to humans, and humans to gods.  In so doing, they fulfil the important mission of 
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ensuring ‘that the whole is closely bound together’ (ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτο αὑτῷ 
συνδεδέσθαι 202 E 6 - 7).  Close to daimones, although not participating in the divine 
nature, she had continued, are daimonic men (andres daimonioi), so called because 
they are experts (sophoi) in the technai of divine interpretation.  Prophecy, divination, 
magic, ability to perform sacrifices and to cast spells, as well as knowledge of 
appropriate priestly rites, enable daimonic men to fulfil some of the hermeneutic 
function of daimones.   
 
It is this specialized hermeneutic capability which sets daimonic men apart 
from the practitioners of other, entirely mundane, technai.  Here is how Diotima 
draws the opposition between the hermeneutic and the banausic technai: 
θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ 
ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ καθεύδουσι· καὶ ὁ 
μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς δαιμόνιος ἀνήρ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ περὶ 
τέχνας ἢ χειρουργίας τινὰς βάναυσος. (203 A 1 – 6) 
(God does not mix with humankind.  No: all communion and conversation 
of gods with humans, both when we are awake and when we are asleep, is 
through the intermediary of the daimonic.  So it is that he who is an expert 
in such matters is a daimonic man, whereas he who is an expert in any 
other matter, be it in the technai or in handicrafts of whatever kind, is of 
the common sort.) 
Whether awake or asleep, goes the parenthetical clause above (203 A 3 – 4), human 
beings can receive divine messages.  The immediate and natural assumption is that 
Diotima is here referring to dreams, and that daimonic men are those who can identify 
portents in dreams.  But her meaning may taken to be wider than this, to encompass 
the reception of divine messages by persons who either find themselves in a less than 
fully conscious state, or suffer a temporary loss of their mental faculties, or operate 
below the threshold of rational control, or indeed are the passive objects of some form 
of divine possession.  Well-known examples of such cases include the Pythia and 
other priestesses, followers of the Corybantic rite, and Bacchants. 
 
  Poets do not figure in Diotima’s list of andres daimonioi.  Yet, Plato was not 
averse to attributing daimonic properties to them.  From the Apology, the Ion and the 
Meno onwards, he unquestioningly accepted the traditional association of poets with 
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seers and soothsayers.9  The above-quoted passage of the Symposium offers further 
evidence of this association, as well as a reason for it.  Diotima’s description of the 
mediating powers of andres daimonioi looks back to the characterisation, in the Ion, 
of the poet as a possessed go-between, through whom God speaks and addresses 
human beings (534 D).  To see how close the two dialogues are on this issue, we need 
only consider Socrates’ description, in the Ion, of the state of mind of the poet at the 
time of composition: 
οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ θείᾳ δυνάμει, ἐπεί, εἰ περὶ ἑνὸς τέχνῃ 
καλῶς ἠπίσταντο λέγειν, κἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ 
θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς 
χρησμῳδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν 
ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ 
πάρεστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς 
ἡμᾶς. 
… it is not mastery that enables them to speak those verses, but a divine 
power, since, if they knew how to speak beautifully on one type of poetry 
by mastering the subject, they would be able to do so for all the others 
also.  That’s why the god takes their intellect away from them when he 
uses them as his servants, as he does prophets and godly diviners, so that 
we who hear should know that they are not the ones who speak those 
verses that are of such high value, for their intellect is not in them: no, the 
god himself is the one who speaks, and he gives voice through them to us. 
(534 C 5- D 4, tr. Woodruff, modified) 
Far from being competent in a technē specific to their calling, poets, in the Ion, are 
presented as mere channels through which the gods address mortals.  Being no more 
than interpreters of the gods (cf. 534 E 4 – 5: οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσὶ 
τῶν θεῶν), poets are not even granted the full authorship of the resulting poems.   
 
The value that was placed on the hermeneutical role in the Ion is diametrically 
opposed to the value that is given to it in the Symposium.  In the earlier dialogue, 
Plato took the hermeneutic office of poets as a ground for denigrating them.  Even the 
epithet entheos (inspired), which he there repeatedly used to describe poets, was laden 
with derogative connotations.  In the Symposium, matters stand otherwise: the 
                                                 
9  Apology, 22 A 8 – B 6;  Ion 534 C 7 – D1; Meno C 1 – D 1. 
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evaluative connotations carried by hermēneuein and its semantic associates have been 
reversed.  As the lines 203 A 1 – 6, quoted above, testify, it is now a fine thing to be 
an interpreter of the gods, since it is to share in Erōs’ own daimonic office.  By 
whatever means the hermeneutic function is stimulated – and it is now granted that it 
may be through non-rational means – its outcome is much to be prized.  So much at 
least emerges from Diotima’s distinction between andres daimonioi and banausoi 
[dēmiourgoi], and her later inclusion, in veiled terms, of Socrates amongst the first 
group (203 A 4 – 6 and 203 D 5 – 8).    
 
Such combination of terminological parallels and opposite evaluative 
connotations suggests that, at some point in Plato’s thinking on poetry, the frenzied 
and irrational bards of the Ion have been transformed into the wise poiētai of the 
Symposium.  This striking evaluative shift shows that the Symposium occupies a 
significant position in the development of Plato’s thinking on poetry.  In the 
Symposium Plato distanced himself from the negative characterisation of poetry that 
he had defended in the Ion, while preparing for, without quite adopting, the fully 
positive view that will emerge in the Phaedrus. 
 
 
III.  Alcibiades: In Praise of Socrates 
  
The account given above of Agathon’s and Diotima’s speeches helps, in turn, to 
clarify one of the more puzzling features of Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates. 
 
When Alcibiades describes the effect that Socrates produces upon his listeners, 
he makes striking use of the vocabulary of possession.  Thus he recounts being 
entranced (cf. 215 C 5 and D 5 – 6, κατέχεσθαι and ἐκπεπλήγμενος) by Socrates’ 
words, as others are possessed by the ‘power that comes out of Marsyas’ mouth’ (215 
C 1- 2), even when mediated through the mediocre rendering of a third-rate flautist.  
The trance of the Corybantes, Alcibiades further claims, is nothing compared to what 
he experiences when listening to Socrates (215 E 1 – 2): his heart leaps, he weeps – 
and he is not alone, everyone else reacts in the same way (215 E 2 – 4).  Being at the 
receiving end (cf. 215 E 5, πάσχειν) of Socrates’ daimonic speech, Alcibiades reports, 
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is like being under a spell.  His assent is forced out of him (cf. 216 A 4 – 5, 
ἀναγκάζειν), so much so that he is little better than a slave to Socrates’ words.   
 
Taken only so far, Alcibiades’ description of the mesmerizing effect of 
Socrates’ speech is a pretty exact match for Socrates’ own account, in the Ion, of the 
ecstasy that the recitation of poetry induces in the audience.  There, too, Socrates had 
spoken of possession; there, too, he had highlighted the passivity of poet and audience 
when receiving the divinely poetic word through the rendering of inspired rhapsodes; 
there, too, he had compared the poet’s audience to Corybantian worshippers, who 
dance themselves senseless.10 
 
But the truth is that, for all their similarities, the two accounts differ in one 
crucial respect.  Far from generating mindlessness and thoughtlessness, Alcibiades 
notes that ecstatic enslavement to Socrates’ words induces moral shame in him.  
Under Socrates’ influence, he is brought to realize the extent of his self-neglect.  So it 
is that, while the poet’s words, in the Ion, induce mindlessness, Socrates’ words, in 
the Symposium, prompt heightened self-consciousness.  While the poet’s 
compositions, in the Ion, causes his listeners to become ecphrones, to take leave of 
their senses, Socrates’ daimonic discourse, in the Symposium, improves the souls of 
those who hear it by prompting them to turn upon themselves and engage in self-
scrutiny.   
 
Once again, therefore, we note that from the Ion to the Symposium, the 
evaluative charge that Plato places on the daimonic has been reversed.  While it was 
mostly negative in the Ion, it is now entirely positive. It looks towards the celebration 
of divine mania in the Phaedrus. 
 
 
IV.  An Unrecorded Elenchus 
 
When Socrates is present, however, few conclusions can ever be drawn in 
black and white.  The above conclusion is no exception.   
                                                 
10 For a discussion of the vocabulary of possession in Plato’s Ion, see S. Stern-Gillet, 'On 
(Mis)interpreting Plato’s Ion'’, Phronesis, vol. 49, no 2, 2004. 
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At the close of Alcibiades’ speech, the party breaks up.  A number of guests, 
including Aristodemus, fall asleep.  When he wakes up, at dawn, he sees that Socrates 
is still conversing with Agathon and Aristophanes, who are about to nod off.  As he 
recalls the scene:  
τόν οὖν Σωκράτη αὐτοῖς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οὐκ 
ἔφη μεμνῆσθαι τῶν λόγων - οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγενέσθαι 
ὑπονυστάζειν τε - τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προροσαναγκάζειν τὸν 
Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἴναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ 
τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα <καὶ> 
κωμῳδοποιὸν εἴναι. (223 C 6 D - 6)   
Well, Socrates was conversing with them; Aristodemus said he didn’t 
remember the rest of what was said – for one thing he hadn’t been there 
from the beginning, and for another he was nodding off – but the gist of it, 
he said, was that Socrates was also forcing them to agree that it belongs 
to the same man to know how to compose comedy and tragedy, and that 
he who is a writer of tragedies by technē is also a writer of comedies. (tr. 
Rowe, modified, my emphasis)  
Whatever interpretation is put on the puzzling second part of this sentence, it needs to 
take account of the disclaimer voiced in the first part: Aristodemus’ account, we are 
told, may not have been wholly accurate since, by his own admission, he was 
befuddled with sleep at the time.  Hence it could well be that Socrates did not quite 
say what Aristodemus seems to remember him saying ...  From that point onwards, 
therefore, the reader intent upon closure must engage in speculation.    
 
However, the text provides clues.  The use of the verb προροσαναγκάζειν, for 
instance, in the above sentence, and of ἀναγκάζειν, three lines later, is significant.  
While Alcibiades had described the power of Socrates’ speech as working its effects 
on the emotions and the conscience of his interlocutors, Aristodemus presents it as 
compelling their reason.  Furthermore, Socrates’ provocative claim may be taken to 
refer back to the words spoken by Agathon in 196 E 4 - 5: ποιητὴς ὁ ῎Ερως ἀγαθὸς ἐν 
κεφαλαίῳ πᾶσαν ποίησιν τὴν κατὰ μουσικήν (‘Love is good as a maker mainly in 
respect of all forms of making that fall under the heading of mousikē’).  Lastly, in 
speaking the lines 223 D 3 – 6, Socrates is made to assert what he had denied in the 
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Ion.  Since poets, he had said then, do not possess a technē, they are not able to excel 
in more than one genre of poetry:   
Therefore, as it is not by technē that, when dealing with their various 
subjects, they [poets] make and speak the many fine things that they do, as 
is so with you when you are dealing with Homer, but as a result of a 
divine dispensation, it follows that each one of them is capable of 
succeeding in only the one thing that the Muse has impelled him to, one 
dithyrambic poetry, another encomia, another choral poetry, another epic, 
and another iambic verse.  In other genres each of them is useless.  (534 B 
7 – C 5) 
Commenting on the discrepancy between Socrates’ claim at the end of the Symposium 
and the above quoted lines of the Ion, Kenneth Dover wryly notes: ‘... reconstruction 
of the form it [i.e. Socrates’ argument in 223 D 3 - 6] might take is a useful exercise 
for students of ancient philosophy.’11  Unfortunately, Dover himself did not undertake 
this tantalizing little exercise.  Here, for what it is worth, is my version of it.   
 
 The lines in question, so it seems to me, are best interpreted as alluding to the 
issue, central to Plato’s poetics, of poetry’s cognitive status.  In the Symposium, as we 
saw, it is consistently assumed that poetry – poiēsis in the narrow sense – is a technē.  
In the Ion, as we also saw, this assumption had being roundly challenged.  The whole 
issue, of course, is of especial concern to the addressees of Socrates’ present remark, 
Agathon and Aristophanes, who are both poets but cultivate only one literary genre 
each.  Socrates, therefore, could anticipate that the claim that he was about to put 
forward would meet with resistance on their part.  Readers of the dialogue, therefore, 
are not surprised to learn from Aristodemus that Socrates had to ‘force’ 
(προσαναχκάζειν) his point upon them.  Clearly, had it not been for the sleepiness of 
the opposition, a Socratic elenchus would have been under way.   
  
In my fictional reconstruction of it, the elenchus proceeds as follows.  Socrates 
begins by securing the assent of Agathon and Aristophanes to the proposition that 
poetry is a technē.  Heavy-eyed, they both nod in agreement.  Socrates then points 
out, using terminology and arguments familiar from the Ion, the Meno, the 
                                                 
11 Dover (1980): 177. 
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Protagoras and the Gorgias, that a practice cannot be classified as a technē unless it 
meets certain criteria.12  One of these criteria is compliance with rules and principles 
that are specific to the technē in question and apply throughout its entire field.  Since 
it is a matter of definition that rules and principles are general or, at least, amenable to 
generalization, it follows that they can be extrapolated from an example of the technē 
in question and applied to the production of another example of it.    
 
Socrates then brings this conceptual point to bear upon the case at hand.  If 
poetry is to rank as a technē, he infers, any poetic composition must exemplify some 
at least of the principles that differentiate poetry from all other technai.  By now, 
Agathon and Aristophanes have grown suspicious but are prevented by drowsiness 
from second-guessing the direction that Socrates’ argument is taking.  They remain 
silent, thus enabling Socrates to press his advantage by drawing the practical 
consequences of his premises.  From the rule-governed nature of technē, it follows 
that competent exponents of any particular genre of poetry should be able to turn their 
hand to any other particular genre of poetry.  As indicated by his use of ἐπίστασθαι in 
223 D 4, Socrates considers that the extrapolation of rules from a poetic genre and 
their application to another is a matter of cognitive expertise.  Do Agathon and 
Aristophanes possess such expertise?    To this question, which hangs in the air as the 
elenchus enfolds, a negative answer suggests itself.   
 
 Sensing blood, Socrates is now about to clinch his argument: no writer of 
tragedies who does not also write comedies, he asserts, can claim to possess the 
technē of poetry, and no writer of comedies who does not also write tragedies can 
claim to possess the technē of poetry.  This proposition puts him in a position to trap 
our two playwrights in a dilemma.  Because neither of you will renounce the claim of 
possessing a technē, he tells them, you cannot limit your expertise to a single genre.  
You, Agathon, must, in all consistency, write comedies.  You, Aristophanes, must, in 
all consistency, write tragedies.  However, if you persist in cultivating only one 
dramatic genre, your claim to possess the technē of poetry cannot be sustained.    
 
                                                 
12 For a 
 list of these criteria, see Stern-Gillet (2004: esp. 182-190) 
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  At this stage of the morning after the night before, even this informal little 
dilemma is beyond Agathon and Aristophanes.  As for Socrates, who knows what 
may have been in his mind at the time?  Was it that there is, after all, no technē of 
poetry?  Or might it have been that each poetic genre has its own technē?  Socrates 
was never one for closure.13   
 


























                                                 
13  I am indebted to Denis O’Brien and Christopher Strachan for constructively critical comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.    
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